This Case commentary is written by Pavuthira Kannathas, a Second-Year law student of University of Colombo

Case Details

Court – Supreme Court of Sri Lanka

Citation - (1990) 2 Sri L.R. 121

Bench – BANDARANAYAKA. J., AMERASINGHE. J. AND KULATUNGA. J..

Decided on – 20 November, 1990

Case Type – Fundamental Rights

Parties

Petitioner – wife of the deceased husband.

Respondent – Attorney General of Sri Lanka.

Abstract

In Sri Lanka, Article 126(2) of the Constitution states that where any person alleges that any fundamental rights adhere to such person has been infringed, he may either himself or by an Attorney at Law on his behalf apply to the Supreme Court by way of petition addressed to such Court praying for relief or redress in respect of such praying for relief or redress in respect of infringement. The Supreme Court of Sri Lanka accessed its interpretation jurisdiction and permitted the petitioner, the wife of the deceased husband to file the petition by way of Purposive Rule of Interpretation and Next-of-Kin principle.

Facts of the Case

The case is an application by a wife complaining of infringement of the Fundamental Rights of her husband under Article 126 of the Constitution. The alleged infringement consists of unlawful arrest and detention of the husband and an assault inflicted on him by police officers when he was in police custody.

Here the question is whether someone else, not the person whose fundamental rights are infringed has locus standi for fundamental rights case. Narratively what is held by Kulathunga, J. is that the wife has no locus standi to maintain the application for her husband, and by Amerasinghe, J. who leaves a path for interpreting the provision.

Issues Raised before the Court

Following that step it is mentioned that this is an application under Article 126 (1) states that the Supreme Court shall have sole and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine any question relating to the infringement or imminent infringement by executive or administrative action of any fundamental right or language right declared and recognized by Chapter III or Chapter IV for the infringement of fundamental rights established under Article 11 that expresses Every person is entitled to freedom of thought, conscience and religion, including the freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice and Article 13 that expresses No person shall be arrested except according to procedure established by law. Any person arrested shall be informed of the reason for his arrest of the Constitution.

Statutory Interpretation

It refers to the action of a court in trying to understand and explain the meaning of a piece of legislation. Statutory interpretation determines the meaning of a text in one or more documents. Such texts of an enactment may be determined by acts of Parliament or its provision or by combining enactments of several acts. There are two units in statutory interpretation i.e. the statutory text and the intention of the Parliament[1].

However, these units are identified mainly by way of four rules: The Literal Rule, the Golden Rule, the Mischief Rule, and the Purposive Rule for fair justice.

Application of Rules of Statutory Interpretation

Judgments of all three judges: Amerasinghe, J. Bandaranayake, J and Kulathunga, J on the 20th of Nov. 1990 are discussed below respectively.

Amerasinghe, J.[2] Discussed the petitioner’s complaint and the question raised by the Learned Senior State Counsel whether the wife has locus standi. Then he cites about what is 126(2) and its interpretations with the support of the cases decided already.

Based on the literal rule Amerasinghe, J interprets the provision established by Article 126 (2) of the Constitution of Sri Lanka which says that where any person alleges that any such fundamental right or language right relating to such person has been infringed or is about to be infringed by executive or administrative action, he may himself or by his attorney at law on his behalf, within one month thereof, by such rule of court as may be in force, apply to the Supreme Court by way of the petition in writing addressed to such court praying for relief or redress in respect of such infringement.

The primary rule of statutory interpretation is literal construction and it is also known as the first and elementary rule of construction. It assumes that the words and phrases of technical legislation are used in their technical meaning.[3].

According to Amerasinghe, J, either the person whose fundamental rights are infringed upon himself or his attorney at law can only institute the fundamental rights action. In this Somawathie case, the applicant is neither based on the literal rule and therefore he concludes the wife has no locus standi to maintain the application for her husband whose fundamental rights were infringed. He dismissed the application.

Unlike applying literal rule by Amerasinghe, J Kulathunga, J[4] Had a view of the purposive rule of statutory interpretation.

Purposive Rule seeks the purpose of making the legislation. According to Lord Siman in Maunsell vs Olins[5] The first task of the court is to consider the knowledge of the draftsman and the objective he had.

In Somawathie's case Kulathunga, J provides importance to the intention of the legislature i.e. the reason why such a provision was enacted. It is for providing a remedy to those whose Fundamental rights are infringed. Here, the applicant, the wife of the husband whose Fundamental rights are infringed had a reasonable relationship and she is entitled to the remedy because of her husband’s death.

Therefore, he expressed his view regarding the Next-of-Kin principle entertained by the parties and further said there is no sufficient evidence for the torture resulting in personal injury caused by the police. Further, it was discussed on unlawful arrest with the facts of the case and with the legal provision established under the code of Criminal Procedure. Finally, he held that there is no sufficient evidence for establishing unlawful detention where the fundamental rights of the deceased husband were infringed and, therefore, he also dismissed the application.

Bandaranayake, J[6] Held that according to Article 126(2) of the Constitution, the petitioner is neither a person: whose rights were infringed nor his Attorney at Law and he agrees other two judges’ decisions.

As Lord Denning stated “The literal method is now completely out of date. It has been replaced by the approach which Lord Diplock described as the “purposive approach” … In all cases now in the interpretation of statutes we adopt such a construction as will “promote the general legislative purpose” underlying the provision.”[7]

Conclusion

In my point of view, all the rules of Statutory Interpretation focus on establishing justice for the parties. The Legislator gives a body of law by using language. The courts do not want to hide the justice or limit it to a small circle only because of language usage and judges want to provide life to the justice. In this case, the Supreme Court of Sri Lanka allows its interpretation beyond the traditional rule of interpretation by way of adopting principles into interpreting the provision. Though the principle of next of kin is not directly permitted by the Constitution of Sri Lanka the court adopted it to reach justice. In another way, though the Constitution allows the Parliament of Sri Lanka to make laws to bind its citizens the way of interpreting law also leads the Judiciary, the Supreme Court, to enact laws known as judge-made laws that also bind the citizens of the Country.

As an independent judiciary is one of the values of establishing a democracy free from the legislature that is inevitably created by the body of political opinion which drags the citizens of the country towards their opinion, this case is significant due to have binding nature including their citizens. This is also one among the other cases in which the petitioners filed the fundamental right cases except the one whose rights are violated and the Attorney at Law on his behalf.

Bibliography

· Somawathie v. Weerasinghe and Others (1990) 2 Sri L.R. 121

· Cross R, Statutory Interpretation (3rd edn, Butterworths 1987)

· Langan P S J, Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes (12th edn, N.M. Tripathi Private Ltd 1976)

· Maunsell vs Olins (1975) AC 373

Barak A(trs), Purposive Interpretation in Law (Princeton University Press 2005) 341<https://books.google.lk/books?id=Raze8ZWIO5cC&pg=PA341&dq=The+literal+method+is+now+completely+out+of+date.+It+has+been+replaced+by+the+approach+which+Lord+Diplock+described&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwiY_YTf9tz6AhXq23MBHQcKBZsQ6AF6BAgDEAI#v=onepage&q=The%20literal%20method%20is%20now%20completely%20out%20of%20date.%20It%20has%20been%20replaced%20by%20the%20approach%20which%20Lord%20Diplock%20described&f=false > accessed 07 September 2

References:

[1] Sir Rupert Cross, Statutory Interpretation ( 3rd edn, Butterworths 1987) 21

[2] Somawathie v Weerasinghe (1990) 2 Sri L.R. 121

[3] P.St.J.Langan, Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes ( 12th edn, N.M. Tripathi Private Ltd 1976) 28

[4] Somawathie v Weerasinghe (1990) 2 Sri L.R. 121

[5] (1975) AC 373

[6] Somawathie v Weerasinghe (1990) 2 Sri L.R. 121

[7] Abaron Barak (trs), Purposive Interpretation in Law (Princeton University Press 2005) 341 < https://books.google.lk/books?id=Raze8ZWIO5cC&pg=PA341&dq=The+literal+method+is+now+completely+out+of+date.+It+has+been+replaced+by+the+approach+which+Lord+Diplock+described&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwiY_YTf9tz6AhXq23MBHQcKBZsQ6AF6BAgDEAI#v=onepage&q=The%20literal%20method%20is%20now%20completely%20out%20of%20date.%20It%20has%20been%20replaced%20by%20the%20approach%20which%20Lord%20Diplock%20described&f=false > accessed 07 September 2024.